Contents
Board (JTCB) concept has been tried in several forms, and at several levels in the command structure to help maximize the unity of effort within that command. History has shown through errors of commission or omission that when military situations require formation of a joint force, there is also the need for a joint targeting coordination board, which should be composed of senior personnel and work directly for the Joint Force
Commander (JFC). This board should handle the macro level coordination issues required to maximize attainment of campaign or operational level objectives. This fragmented command and control system often led to duplicate targeting of some sites and failure to attack others.
HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED

Gulf War
Between 1975 (NCA) and CINC, and were allowed to use assets to best accomplish overall objectives.
Since the initial phase of Desert Storm was solely an air operation, the JFACC, General Homer, was given responsibility to coordinate interdiction efforts of all components. A Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) was formed under the JFACC to coordinate, plan, and execute the overall air operations plan in accordance with CINC strategy. This meant potential interdiction/operational depth target requests from all component commanders were recommended to the JTCB for incorporation into the JFACC concept of operations and eventually, if approved, into the Air Tasking Order (ATO) for execution. The JTCB in this role was successful in prioritizing targets, missions, and platforms to meet theater objectives, and additionally, this forum provided a centralized theater target database from which to draw upon.
There were problems with positioning the coordination board at this level, however. The software and communications equipment used were not compatible with US Navy systems, making it very difficult for Navy personnel to integrate well into the scheme of daily operations. Additionally, the JFACC staff was overwhelmingly United
States Air Force (USAF), which led Navy officials to believe they were not getting sufficient input in the targeting process. Additionally, as land operations approached and commenced, the Army and Marine ground forces felt they were not apportioned adequate air resources for direct support missions. This was partially due to General Schwarzkopf, the JFC, dual-hatting himself as the Land Component Commander (LCC), causing a shortage of interaction with his ground forces commanders when issues of apportionment arose. The JFC would go directly to the JFACC without discussing his thoughts with the LCC. This lack of interaction led the ground commanders to believe they were was not being adequately represented in the JFACC and JTCB apportioning process. And although the CINC's overall objectives and guidance were clear, there was at times a lack of clear dissemination of intermediate objectives, which caused some confusion with subordinate commanders during land operations. 5 Once again, even though the Gulf War was a major success, there was a feeling among all services except the USAF that the targeting coordination process was deficient.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Operations and target coordination in Bosnia-Herzegovina ( Positioning the JTCB below the JFC level, discussed above and in further detail later in this paper, magnified already existing problems with the joint targeting process.
Additionally, because of the overwhelming ratio of air operations to the overall scheme during both the Gulf War and Bosnia operations, these may not be good examples to use when establishing doctrine.
RECENT LESSONS LEARNED
Many improvements have been made in the area of targeting coordination since the Gulf War. Of note is the personnel makeup of a current JFACC. JFACC staffing now includes a more evenly weighted mix between services. This leads to a better integration of assets because there is a superior mix of subject matter experts on-hand to optimize use of weapons platforms. It also increases trust between all components that the ATO reflects an unbiased product. Additionally, it is now commonplace in joint exercises to [ 13
